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Security 
DAVID LOWE 
The history of Australian security during the twentieth century is told 
largely in accounts of Australia in world affairs, and often in simplified form. 
According to successive governments, Australian security challenges have 
arisen from the tension between geography (an island continent in the South 
Pacific) and history (of British settlement and predominance in shaping 
institutions and identity). In exploring Australian military preparation and 
planning, involvement in wars, the protests that resulted and Australia's 
foreign policies more generally, the more probing interpretations go beyond 
the conventional tension between geography and history. 
This chapter deals principally with Australia in world affairs, but 
examines connections between internal and external threats. It is also 
sensitive to the tension between a global Australian outlook, owing 
much to European and then Anglo-American thinking, and a form of 
provincialism that certainly derived from geography but also from the 
circumstances of Australia's continental Federation. European thought is 
both indispensable and inadequate in thinking through the political and 
historical circumstances of formerly colonised states such as India. 1 There 
is also something indispensable and yet inadequate about what has, in 
recent years, been called 'the British World' - the empire formed by British 
settlement and the extension of British values - as the lens through which 
to view all Australian security fears and reactions. 2 Similarly, although 
deployed often and casually by politicians, the concept of security involves 
more than protection against foreign enemies: studies of security require 
exploration of connections between internal and external threats; and they 
r Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton University Press, 2000). 
2 Good explorations of the concept of the British World are found in Carl Bridge and 
Kent Fedorowich (eds), The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity (London: Frank 
Cass, 2003). 
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suggest that, as security links closely to identity; it necessarily includes and 
excludes groups of people in its articulation.3 
The history of Australia's search for security divides logically into the two 
halves of the twentieth century. Up to the mid-r95os participation in world 
wars as part of the British Empire shaped Australians' global outlook. This 
was accompanied by a preference for a citizen soldiery rather than large 
professional forces, and an expeditionary mentality. Thereafter, shifts in world 
power and rapid, sometimes unpredictable, decolonisation in Southeast Asia 
forced revisions to the strategic outlook and set in train a persistent tension 
between continental and forward defence, which sought preparedness to 
meet threats well beyond Australian shores. These alternatives led in turn 
to inconclusiveness over the balance between self-reliance and alliance. 
Australians' identification with the British World and its own restrictive 
immigration policy (for much of the century known as the white Australia 
policy) kept race close to considerations of security - both internal threats 
and dangers in the international environment. This picture changed quickly 
from the late 1960s as the restrictive immigration policy was progressively 
dismantled and the European-American security buffer between Australia 
and Southeast Asia diminished; but Australian considerations of security did 
not adjust as quickly. At the end of the twentieth century the echoes of past 
dilemmas remained. 
Provincial globalism 
For more than 50 years after Federation, Australia's globalism - here 
meaning a determinedly international prism through which economic, 
defence and foreign policies unfold - reflected a geographically distinctive 
vantage point of a people who saw themselves as part of 'the British World' 
with Britain at its centre. Being part of the imperial project while asserting 
distinctive, regional interests and arguing for a greater role in strategic 
decision making was a fundamental task for Australian leaders. Australian 
globalism had two other essential qualities. It was not only tied inextricably 
to an idea of British progress but it also lent a strategic logic to support 
for others' empires and to Australia's own local empire with its possible 
extensions. It was also recognised by other major players in international 
3 See David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity, rev. edn (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) and an Australian 
equivalent, Anthony Burke, Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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affairs as a dependent form of globalism. Bold Australian declarations of 
independence or assertiveness did not necessarily lead to great change; and 
the decisions of others brought about some of the most significant changes 
to Australians' security Australian globalism, then, can logically be termed 
a provincial globalism. 
The three strands of Australia's provincial globalism can be seen in the 
major foreign policy, war and security episodes of the first two-thirds of 
the twentieth century. Placement within a British world is fundamental to 
understanding Australian hopes, fears and commitments. From the outset, 
this imagined Britishness involved a considered embrace of British Empire 
interests around the world. The military backdrop to Australia's Federation 
was the Australian expeditionary force in the South African War against the 
Boers.4 But this did not imply an unquestioning approach to the Empire's 
needs and interests. 'Considered embrace' meant that hard questions could 
and should be asked at the same time as Australian governments acted to 
defend the Empire, and it also carried the expectation that Australia's distinc-
tive, regional security concerns would be incorporated in imperial planning. 
By the time Australians entered World War l they had become preoccupied 
with their security in the Pacific. Leading statesmen, including Prime Minister 
Alfred Deakin, were alarmed by the rise of Japan, and its consequences for 
Australia. British leaders were also seized by Japan's growing strength, but 
responded in 1902 by making an alliance with Japan to protect British inter-
ests in the Far East. With renewal, the treaty covered the next 20 years. In 1905 
the divergence between Australian and British views was highlighted when 
the Japanese crushed the Russian Navy in the battle of Tsushima, thereby 
underlining their capacity for military conquest. 
Australians were deeply conscious of the consequences of great power 
struggles for their region.5 Watching the German Navy grow rapidly, and 
foreseeing possible demands on the Royal Navy in Europe, Alfred Deakin 
pushed successfully for the formation of the Royal Australian Navy 
(established in r9n) rather than relying on Australian financial contributions 
to the Royal Navy's auxiliary Pacific fleet. As prime minister, Deakin also 
encouraged American interest in the security of the Western Pacific, securing 
the visit of the US Navy Battle Fleet (called the 'Great White' Fleet) on its 
4 Craig Wilcox, Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
5 Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era, 1820--1920 
(Melbourne University Press, 1980), pp. 203-21; Neville Meaney; A History of Australian 
Defence and Foreign Policy, 1901-23. Volume 1, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-1914 
(Sydney University Press, 1976). 
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grand tour in 1908; and, with the backing of the Labor Party, developed 
coastal defences and introduced compulsory military training. 
Sending the cream of Australian manhood to war in 1914 provided the 
basis for more aggressive argument that Australia's regional interests not be 
overlooked during the war. In 1914 the Japanese, as agreed with the British, 
occupied those parts of the former German empire north of the equator. 
When the British endorsed their continued occupation for the war's dura-
tion, without informing the Australians, Prime Minister William Morris 
Hughes resolved to insist on an Australian voice in planning security in the 
Pacific. 
There was some basis to Hughes' conviction that Australia was earning 
the right to be heard in strategic discussions. Upon the outbreak of war, 
volunteers swelled the ranks of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), which 
sailed with New Zealand troops (soon to be known as Anzacs) in November 
1914. As is told in detail elsewhere, the Anzacs trained in Egypt for over four 
months before landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915, as part of a 
spectacularly unsuccessful plan to defeat Turkey. After Gallipoli, where 8,141 
Australians were killed, the AIF expanded from two divisions to five in 1916, 
and shared with other armies on the Western Front the same horrific conse-
quences of outdated strategy colliding with advanced ballistics weaponry in 
trench warfare. In a war of attrition, Australian troops certainly mattered; 
and minor but distinguished roles were played by the Australian Light 
Horse in Palestine and the Royal Australian Navy (under British command). 
The Australian fighting effort was huge, relative to Australia's size. It was 
Australians' baptism of fire at Gallipoli that would be remembered above all. 
The Anzacs' blend of courage, mateship and disdain for authority became a 
well-promoted official story and laid the basis for the 1\nzac legend'. 
Despite these significant Australian contributions, Hughes made little 
ground in London on the Japanese issue during the course of the war. 
He regarded the outcomes of the peace making at the end of the war as 
qualified successes. In the Pacific, he would have preferred simple Australian 
annexation of former German possessions south of the equator (including 
German New Guinea), but the new League of Nations C-class mandate was 
an acceptable second-best, preserving control over trade and the movement 
of people although preventing the construction of military bases. The 
Japanese retained control over German territories north of the equator, 
but failed in their efforts to have a racial equality clause included in the 
League's Covenant. Otherwise, the collective security principle endorsed 
by the League of Nations struck Hughes as an unwanted infringement on 
497 
DAVID LOWE 
sovereignty that might result in the Royal Navy having to respond to others 
at Australia's expense.6 And there were divisions among fellow Dominions in 
relation to the future making of imperial policy. The Canadians and South 
Africans ended the war eager for constitutional clarity to catch up with their 
respective senses of equality and independence. The Australians and New 
Zealanders, by contrast, looked to greater coordination of imperial defence 
planning in the next stage of the Empire, but would be disappointed in 
the lack of change that followed. The subsequent evolution of the British 
Commonwealth (as the self-governing parts became known in the 1920s) 
owed much less to Australian ideas than the agitation of others. 
The war also saw what one historian has called the 'origins of political 
surveillance' in Australia, the formation of a Commonwealth Police Force 
charged with identifying and prosecuting those whose opposition to the war 
effort manifested in ways that could be deemed subversive.7 Hughes' impa-
tience with State police forces and his determination to punish opponents 
such as the revolutionary Industrial Workers of the World were fundamental 
to this development. Non-British immigrants declared to be 'enemy aliens' 
suffered similarly, amid a sustained propaganda campaign that demonised 
the German 'Hun'. Around 7,000 civilians were interned during the war.8 
Although the Commonwealth Police Force was disbanded quickly at the end 
of the war, an intelligence and surveillance capacity continued to develop. 
The Commonwealth Investigation Branch, formed from military intelli-
gence officers and remnants of the Commonwealth Police Force, operated 
from the Attorney-General's Department and maintained close ties with the 
British intelligence service, MI5. Surveillance concentrated on those at either 
end of the political spectrum, especially members of the new Communist 
Party but also sympathisers with the fascist regimes that emerged in 
Europe. The Commonwealth Investigation Branch worked closely with the 
Australian Customs Department during the 1920s and 1930s, tightening control 
over passports and outward journeys by Australians under surveillance, 
restricting literature either subversive or undermining moral standards, and 
6 There is now a strong literature assessing the diplomatic battles of Hughes, including 
WJ. Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy (Melbourne: Thomas 
Nelson, 1978); L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, 1914-1952. William Morris Hughes: A 
Political Biography, Volume 2 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1979); Peter Spartalis, The 
Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983); Carl Bridge, William 
Hughes: Australia (London: Haus Publishers, 2on). 
7 Frank Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 
1983). 
8 Gerhard Fischer, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Home.front Experience in Australia, 
1914-1920 (Brisbane: UQP, 1989). 
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borrowing from South African legislation to exclude any person deemed 'an 
undesirable inhabitant or visitor' based on information received from other 
governments. 9 
Australian politicians and policy makers grappled during the inter-war 
period with the enduring problem of the Pacific's uncertain standing in 
imperial defence plans. Japan continued its militarisation and the annex-
ation of Manchuria in 1931, demonstrating a preparedness to use force in its 
quest for natural resources. This was a major Australian concern. In Europe, 
the rearmament that followed Hitler's accession to power in Germany in 
1933 made it increasingly likely that in the event of another war, the British 
Commonwealth's resources would be stretched. A small group of Australians 
saw new possibilities in international relations, while government policies 
turned inwards. Some of these internationalists advocated strengthening 
the League of Nations to promote liberalism and arbitrate in international 
disputes. Others developed transnational ties with women's groups and 
advocates of racial equality; but these views did not translate to government 
policy. The crippling effects of the Depression contributed to the building of 
higher walls, especially tariff and customs, and a more insistent reliance on 
British trade and finance, interwoven with defence planning, as the basis of 
Australian security. 
The Americans, although adversely affected by higher Australian tariffs, 
remained a factor in Australian thinking about the Pacific. In 1919 Billy 
Hughes revisited some of Deakin's earlier consideration of a possible 
extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the Pacific - without eliciting any 
American response. In the 1930s Australians made a more comprehensive 
case for a Pacific pact, linked to the League of Nations Covenant and 
ideally involving the British, Americans, Japanese, Russians and other 
European powers with strong interests in the region, notably France and the 
Netherlands. The proposal was over-ambitious in scope and London's cool 
response sealed its fate. 
Both of these episodes reinforced Australians' anxieties about their 
dependency on great powers whose geopolitical priorities appeared to lie 
distant from Australia. Even before World War I, and especially afterwards, 
Australian policy makers were sensitive to how conflicts in the northern 
hemisphere might have consequences for the southern. World War l 
accentuated the global-regional interdependence rather than weakening 
9 Frank Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia: A History of ASIO and National 
Surveillance (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2008), pp. 26-4r. 
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Australians' conviction of the centrality of the British World alliances. Those 
in London knew this: in the late 1930s the British were careful to ensure that 
all efforts in dealing with Hitler short of war were taken, partly in order that 
the Dominions' support would be certain if war came. 
For their part, Australian leaders, with the exception of elder statesman 
Billy Hughes, were consistent in their support for measures to appease Hitler. 
Notwithstanding some impressive progress in science and technology linked 
to defence industries, Australians' reliance on British naval strength grew. 
They had rapidly reduced spending on defence, especially as the Depression 
took hold. Only from 1935, when the international situation had worsened, 
did spending increase substantially, and by this time the munitions, naval 
and air equipment urgently sought from Britain were needed for Britain's 
own preparations. Having anxiously watched the stop-start building of the 
new British fortress at Singapore as the main barrier to a potential attack from 
Japan, the Australians had to rely on it more than they wanted.rn As a result, 
in the words of the historian Christopher Waters, the prime ministers Joseph 
Lyons and Robert Menzies, the ex-prime minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce 
who was now High Commissioner in London and the treasurer Richard 
Casey 'were powerful advocates for appeasement, both within the secret 
councils of the empire and in the public arena. Indeed, on many occasions 
these men were well out in front of their colleagues in London in calling for 
more far-reaching measures of appeasement of Germany and Italy.'rr Upon 
the outbreak of war in Europe, when the nightmare prospect of an over-
stretched Royal Navy was realised, Australians mounted similar arguments 
for concessions that might keep Japan from embarking on conquest. 
World War 2 saw Australian forces again joining an imperial force (and 
those volunteering for overseas service formed the Second AIF). This time the 
Pacific would become a major theatre of war, but despite the apparent threat 
to Australia, this did not transform its responses or its security dilemmas. 
By prior agreement, the vessels of the Royal Australian Navy came under 
the control of the British Admiralty in 1939. In effect, the Royal Australian 
Air Force (RAAP) saw the same transfer of control. After participating in an 
Empire Air Training Scheme, more than 26,000 Australian aircrew served in 
rn Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, 3rd edn (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
ch. 6. An argument that Australia was better prepared than most historians have sug-
gested is put by A. T. Ross, Armed & Ready: The Industrial Development and Defence of 
Australia, 1900-1945 (Sydney: Turton & Armstrong, 1995). 
n Christopher Waters, Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy & the Origins of 
World War II (London: LB. Tauris, 2or2), pp. 243-4. 
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the Royal Air Force (RAF). Eventually there were seventeen RAAF squadrons 
in the RAF, and they did not return to Australia at the height of the Japanese 
threat in 1941-42. 12 At the outbreak of war, the Australian Army comprised 
conscript Militia and volunteers, and only the latter were able serve overseas. 
The 6th, 7th and later the 9th divisions were sent to the Mediterranean 
theatre while most of the ill-fated 8th Division surrendered to the Japanese 
at Singapore and in the smaller islands to the north of Australia in the early 
months of 1942. 13 
Australians were joined in the Mediterranean by the New Zealanders, 
but the war did not trigger coordinated responses among the Dominions. 
With limited Dominion involvement in British decision making - there was 
nothing in London like the Imperial War Cabinet of World War l and only a 
token Pacific War Council in Washington - the Australians struggled to make 
their voices heard in Anglo-American decision making. The success of the 
Anglo-American alliance was partly the result of Churchill's and Roosevelt's 
marginalisation of other Allies. It took the Australians some time to learn of 
their 'Beat Hitler First' strategy, which meant concentrating effort in Europe 
and fighting only a 'holding war' in the Pacific.'4 
Australian forces in the Pacific played a role subordinate to the Americans. 
General Douglas MacArthur removed to Australia after the fall of the 
Philippines and became the commander of all Allied forces in the South-West 
Pacific Area. As the most logical base from which to launch a counter-attack 
against the Japanese, Australia became a strategic responsibility of the 
United States. Although the Japanese decided not to attempt an invasion 
of Australia, it seemed that this was their intent in the middle months of 
1942, when they launched an overland campaign to capture Port Moresby in 
Papua New Guinea. In conditions made appalling by the heat, mud, water, 
precipitous inclines and diseases common in the jungle, Australian Militia 
troops, soon supported by the returned 7th Division, stopped the Japanese 
advance over the Kokoda Track. Later, and especially in the hands of Prime 
Minister Paul Keating in the early 1990s, Kokoda jostled with Gallipoli for 
12 See John McCarthy; A Last Call of Empire: Australian Aircrew, Britain and the Empire Air 
Training Scheme (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988). 
13 Grey; A Military History of Australia, pp. 159-63. 
14 There has been debate over the implications for Australia of the 'Beat Hitler First' 
policy. See David Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the 
Pacific War, 1939-41 (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1988), pp. ro2, 215-29; Carl Bridge, 
'Poland to Pearl Harbor', in Carl Bridge (ed.), Munich to Vietnam: Australia's Relations 
with Britain and the United States since the 1930s (Melbourne University Press, 1991), 
pp. 44-8. 
501 
DAVID LOWE 
pre-eminence in the list of battles that could match extraordinary resilience 
with a nation-making significance. 
MacArthur's presence in Australia brought no special access to strategic 
decision making. When, in 1943, top-level meetings between the Allied 
powers began to discuss plans for defeating the Japanese and for the post-war 
Pacific, the Australians were not consulted. Prime Minister john Curtin and 
his Minister for External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, found greater opportunities 
for activism in 1944, when post-war planning featured more prominently. 
Some of their ideas for the extension of imperial-Australian power were 
too bold. Curtin's idea of a new imperial secretariat that would better 
coordinate the Empire's foreign policy was too much for the South Africans 
and Canadians, even before the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, 
dismissed it.15 Evatt's adventurous Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 
January 1944 offended both Britain and the United States. It was an attempt 
to claim standing in any decisions about the post-war Pacific, bring concerted 
involvement in welfare and development for Pacific Islanders, and reject 
the notion that US occupation of islands during the war implied claim to 
sovereignty afterwards but its only lasting result was the establishment of 
a South Pacific Commission in 1947. 16 More successful was Evatt's role in 
extending the reach of the new United Nations General Assembly and, at least 
initially, envisaging a strong role for its Economic and Social Council. At the 
San Francisco conference in 1945 that established the United Nations, Evatt 
argued indefatigably to increase the role of smaller powers by expanding the 
membership of the United Nations Security Council and limit the veto rights 
of the permanent members. 17 
Distinctive Australian security concerns had been hard to elevate among 
the Allied partners as World War 2 became a 'total' war, extreme in its 
mobilisation of whole populations, in the weapons used and in the aims of 
warring parties. Australia's losses were still significant: just under 34,000 of its 
people were killed (among other Dominions, Canada suffered a loss of 40,000 
people and over 397,000 British lives were lost). The grim addition was the 
number of Australian soldiers who died after being captured and maltreated 
by the Japanese. One-third of the 22,000 captured in the Pacific did not live 
to the war's end.18 Total war also prompted massive efforts at home, where 
15 Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (London: 
Continuum, 2008), pp. 129-44· 
16 Ibid., pp. n5-28. 
17 David Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century (Melbourne: Circa, 2006), 
pp. 73-91. 
18 Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp. 193-6. 
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more than r million Americans passed through. As Lizzie Collingharn notes, 
Australia's role as a large base and producer of food was notable in a world 
transformed by airpower and new mobility: 
No matter how valiant Australian efforts in battle, these campaigns were 
peripheral in the defeat of both Germany and Japan. The more effective, 
and less publicised, Australian contribution to the war effort was to supply 
American troops in the Pacific with 420,000 pairs of trousers, well over a 
million knitted shirts, 270,000 battle jackets, II million pairs of socks, r.5 million 
blankets and r.8 million boots and shoes ... Most importantly, over half of the 
supplies the United States took from Australia came in the form of food. 19 
This also hints at the mobilisation of the state more generally. The years 
following World War 2 saw a major increase in the powers of the federal 
government at the expense of the States. During the war the Commonwealth 
also adopted security measures at the expense of individual liberties. 
National Security Regulations from 1939 provided for extensive government 
control of industry and the workforce, and both the Communist Party and 
the right-wing Australia First Movement were proscribed. The state reacted 
drastically to counteract a perceived threat of enemies within: of the 52,000 
'aliens', 22,000 were at some stage declared enemies and had their liberties 
severely circumscribed. Internment practices varied between the States, but 
rose in response to heightened fears in the middle years of the war. German 
and Italian male immigrants were the most likely to be interned, especially 
those more recently arrived (includingjewish refugees). The smaller Japanese 
population endured the harshest treatment. Around 7,000 residents were 
interned, and a similar number of aliens sent to Australia by Allies meant 
that internment numbers reached a peak of 12,000. Crucially, there was no 
category of Australian citizen until the Citizenship Act came into operation on 
26 January 1949. Until then, 'British subject' was the official status requiring 
allegiance to the crown; this in turn encouraged the equation of foreignness 
with a lack of loyalty. Without an alternative definition of citizenship, those 
subject to internment had no recourse to the contributions they might have 
made to their new homeland.20 
19 Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food (London: 
Allen Lane, 2on), p. 443. 
20 Margaret Bevege, Behind Barbed Wire: Internment in Australia during World War II 
(Brisbane: UQP, i993); Ilma Martinuzzi O'Brien, 'Citizenship, Rights, and Emergency 
Powers in Second World War Australia', Australian journal of Politics and History, 53, 2 
(2007): 207-22; Joan Beaumont, Ilma Martinuzzi O'Brien and Mathew Trinca, Under 
Suspicion: Citizenship and Internment in Australia during the Second World War (Canberra: 
National Museum of Australia, 2008). 
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Long transition 
There is now a strong consensus that Australia's multilayered closeness 
with Britain did not unravel with World War 2 or quickly thereafter; rather, 
it endured, particularly with respect to the defence aspect of the relation-
ship. Prime Minister Curtin' s claim at the end of 1941 that 'Australia looks 
to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the 
United Kingdom' continues to be seized on as a public transfer of primary 
allegiance to the United States, but its status as a turning point is not well 
founded. As historians such as Wayne Reynolds and James Curran have 
argued, most Australians anticipated and welcomed the prospect of some 
form of major revival of empire after the war. 2 l 
There was, in fact, a serious rehearsal for the British Commonwealth's 
mobilisation for the next world war in the early 1950s, when the threat of a 
sudden Soviet assault seemed real. The Menzies government took its role 
seriously and prepared for war along familiar lines. It committed to sending 
the first division raised to the Middle East again, this time to defend British 
air bases from which attacks would be launched on the Soviet Union; it insti-
gated a recruitment drive and reintroduced compulsory military training; it 
embarked on a costly stockpiling exercise; it tried, unsuccessfully, to outlaw 
the Australian Communist Party; it drew up lists of enemy aliens for intern-
ment upon the outbreak of war; and it tried, through a combination of 
legal and bureaucratic innovations, to create something approximating the 
US national security state. What Les Louis has called a 'Keynesian warfare 
state' marked Australia's transition from World War 2 to the Cold War.22 An 
overheated economy and changed international conditions meant that the 
more ambitious aspects of a national security state were not realised. But 
Menzies effectively harnessed and extended earlier government efforts to 
link defence preparations to the task of national development, and, through 
the recently established Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) and Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), linked growing 
surveillance activities to government-defined threats to security, internal 
and external. 23 
21 Wayne Reynolds, Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Melbourne University Press, 2000); 
James Curran, Curtin's Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2on). 
22 L.J. Louis, Menzies' Cold War: A Reinterpretation (Melbourne: Red Rag Publications, 
2001). 
23 David Lowe, Menzies and the 'great world struggle': Australia's Cold War 1948-1954 (Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 1999); David McKnight, Australia's Spies and Their Secrets (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1994); Cain, Terrorism & Intelligence in Australia, pp. 76-158. 
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Both of the new security agencies gained in authority when a 
Canberra-based Soviet diplomat, Vladimir Petrov, defected to Australia 
in 1954· His wife, Evdokia, joined him in a blaze of publicity and airport 
drama. ASIO officers managed the defections, and Petrov brought with him 
documents purporting to show evidence of espionage in Australia. A Royal 
Commission on Espionage from 1954 to 1955 did not find a major spy ring at 
work, nor did it lead to prosecutions, but it was politically charged due to 
the naming of staff of the Labor Opposition leader, Evatt, and his appear-
ance as counsel for them until the commissioners ordered him to withdraw. 
The Commission could not, for security reasons, discuss the evidence of 
some spying that was already known. Through sharing of American decoded 
cables sent by the Soviets from their embassy, the Australians knew of sev-
eral leaks of documents, mainly towards the end of the war. ASIO's creation 
owed much to these revelations and the possible repercussions for Australia's 
security standing with its allies in the Cold War. 24 
Even after fears of another world war had ebbed, most Australians 
recognised that while Britain in the 1950s was an imperial power in decline, 
especially after the prestige-shattering Suez affair in 1956, it was still a power 
with considerable international influence and assets. As confirmed in atomic 
testing off the Australian coast and in Australia's desert during the 1950s, 
Britain also had a nuclear capability matched with long-range missiles. Menzies 
even harboured hopes that an Australian atomic bomb might emerge from 
Anglo-Australian testing collaborations. And London was still at the heart of 
the sterling bloc, which remained the basis of Australian financial and trading 
relationships with the rest of the world. 
Instead of fighting a third world war, Australian forces formed part of 
the Commonwealth Division defending South Korea from North Korea 
and its Chinese ally from 1950 to 1953· Having contributed to the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, the initial Australian components 
were not far away when war broke out on the Korean peninsula in June 
1950. One squadron of RAAP fighters and one army battalion transferred 
there, and a second battalion followed in June 1952. At the ceasefire in July 
1953 the Australians killed numbered 339. 25 Australia's role was small in a UN 
force dominated by the Americans, but at a strategic level it helped shape a 
24 Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair, rev. edn (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2004); Desmond 
Ball and David Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network, 1944-1950 (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 1998). 
25 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 214; Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War 
1950-53. Volume 1, Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, r981). 
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diplomatic climatei<i'.Onducive to the signing of the Australia, New Zealand 
and United States$ecurity Treaty (ANZUS) in l95I. 
The crucial clauses of ANZUS were not overly reassuring: it was less a 
well-defined 'insurance policy' than the bones of a new security relation-
ship with the Americans in need of flesh. One of the US reactions after the 
Korean War was to .. be more wary of shouldering the burden of military alli-
ance action in Asia. Although the Australians began to standardise military 
equipment with the Americans from 1957 and tried hard to make the ANZUS 
Council into an effective strategic planning body, they spent much of their 
time trying to elicit clarity around the circumstances in which the Americans 
would respond to a request for help. The two main sources of Australian 
regional fears were Chinese support for Vietnamese and other Asian com-
munist parties, conjuring the spectre of 'falling dominoes' in Southeast Asia; 
and Indonesia under President Sukarno and a growing communist influence. 
As historians of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War have suggested, 
the uncertainty surrounding the Americans' preparedness to wage major 
campaigns against aggression in Asia was a factor behind the Australian 
eagerness to commit their own forces there. 26 In the meantime, up to 1967 
when the British announced their intention to withdraw military forces from 
'east of Suez', Canberra continued to look to the British military presence in 
Malaysia and Singapore to provide at least some military-strategic certainty 
in the region. 27 
Assumptions in defence planning changed slowly. Continental defence 
underpinned the 1903 Defence Act's provision that conscripts not be required 
to serve overseas. The defence of the Australian continent was thereafter 
axiomatic. For most of the twentieth century, however, there was arguably a 
disjunction between axiom and the operational practices of Australian armed 
forces. In other words, in every war and crisis prompting Australian military 
involvement, Australian governments sent their forces, primarily soldiers, 
overseas. For two-thirds of the century, official defence planning squared 
the circle by emphasising Australia's potential expeditionary role in conflicts 
involving Britain and the United States, upon whom Australia was dependent 
for security. A strong regional consciousness accompanied defence planning 
26 Gregory Pemberton, Atl the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1987); John Murphy, Harvest of Fear: Australia's Vietnam War (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1993); Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and 
Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965 (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1992). 
27 Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations and the 'Turn to Europe', 1961-1972 (London: 
Boydell & Brewer, 2008). 
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after World War 2 and the rapid decolonisation in much of Southeast Asia, 
but it also acknowledged the global context of the Cold War. The post-war 
era began with regional security treaties, defence cooperation for the Anglo-
N ew Zealand-Australia-Malaya Area (ANZAM, 1948), ANZUS, and the South 
East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO, 1954). They formed part of a 'forward 
defence' posture, a policy of cooperation with allies to meet threats from 
Australia's potential enemies in the region rather than on Australian shores. 
From the early 1970s, however, successive defence white papers in 1976, 1987 
and 1994 highlighted the difference between theory and practice. These papers 
stressed the primacy of geography in peacetime planning. All the while, 
Australian military involvement in distant theatres continued, primarily now 
in peacekeeping roles as Canberra adjusted to detente, a renewed or 'second' 
Cold War phase in the 1980s, and then the end of the Cold War.28 
The shift in composition and character of the Australian Army also 
took time, but from the mid-196os it would be decisive. Up to this time, 
citizen soldiery, embodying the republican ideal of trained citizens in arms 
providing the backbone of the nation's defence, was linked to compulsory 
military training. Until 1942, when conscription for service south of the 
equator was introduced, volunteering to join military expeditions overseas 
was an especially celebrated feature of Australians at war. Recruitment in 
World War r suggested that the citizen soldier would volunteer to serve 
overseas in defence of Australia when needed. Australian governments 
implied as much by not legislating for Militia forces to serve overseas, but 
instead raising the First and Second AIFs from citizens who joined up only 
for the duration of the war. Indeed, this voluntarism has been integral to 
the formation, growth and endurance of the Anzac legend, and has since 
mediated the ways in which the military relates to civil society. For example, 
political, religious and civic leaders have found connections between 
volunteering for armed service and volunteering for service in lifesaving clubs 
and firefighting groups. 
The Defence Act also forbade the formation of regular infantry battalions, 
and a small home-grown professional officer corps took shape only after the 
establishment of the Royal Military College in r9n. Significant military action 
depended on the rapid raising of a citizen army. The situation also bred ten-
sion between staff corps and citizen officers during the first years of World 
War 2, but the experiences of war, including the deployment of the Militia 
28 Peter Edwards and David Goldsworthy (eds), Facing North: A Century of Australian 
Engagement with Asia. Volume 2, 1970s to 2000 (Melbourne University Press, 2003). 
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outside of Australia to Papua New Guinea and surrounding islands, fostered 
a sense of one army. 
When Menzies was preparing to raise an expeditionary force in the early 
1950s to assist in defence of British air bases in the Middle East in anticipation 
of another world war, he initially envisaged a strong role for citizen soldiery. 
The last major episode of compulsory military training at this time had 
echoes of earlier schemes but was disconnected from changing strategic 
circumstances and military needs. Increasingly, it was the regular army (and 
smaller naval and air force contingents) that led Australian involvement in 
successive Cold War 'counterinsurgency' operations overseas, including 
Malaya and Vietnam, and the Citizen Military Force grew less significant. 
In 1964, when the government introduced compulsory national service 
for service overseas, it was effectively enlisting men as short-term regular 
soldiers rather than mobilising a citizen army. Thereafter, reorganisation and 
specialisation within the armed forces further marginalised citizens, later 
known as Reserves, within Australian Army ranks. Where Australians have 
played leading roles in international peacekeeping since the end of the Cold 
War, such as in Cambodia (1991-93), Somalia (1992) and the International 
Force for East Timar (1999-2000 ), regular soldiers have made up the forces. 
These soldiers have combined with the Australian Federal Police - an agency 
that has worked more closely with the military in meeting post-Cold War 
security concerns - to help maintain stable environments in Australia's 
region, such as in the Solomon Islands since 2003. 
It was difficult for Australians to adjust to the nature and pace of post-war 
decolonisation. There was a provincial feel to the doggedness with which 
Australians built and defended their local empire and supported others' colo-
nial outposts in their region. The main component of Australia's empire 
was the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. After World War 2, the 
Australian territory of Papua was combined with mandated New Guinea 
and administered under the new United Nations trusteeship system. Up to 
the early 1960s, local empire was viewed primarily in terms of security, as a 
regional buffer and supporting lines of defence communications. Post-war 
Australian governments worked hard to keep Papua New Guinea (PNG) free 
from international scrutiny and to bolster the Dutch colonial presence in the 
western half of the island. 
Through the 1950s the Coalition government led by Menzies maintained 
a hard line in favour of Dutch retention of the western part of the island. It 
became the focal point for fierce campaigns in the United Nations as the 
membership of that body swelled with newly independent nations anxious 
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to see decolonisation extend to all parts of the world. Similarly; up to the 
early 1960s the Australian hold on PNG seemed to tighten with the rise of 
communism as a major factor in Southeast Asian politics, and with the growing 
prospect of a land border with Indonesia should the Dutch finally relinquish 
their part of the island (which they did in 1962). Possession of PNG meant that 
no potential enemy could seize control of it. As the historian WJ. Hudson 
noted caustically, this determinedly colonial stance clashed with the growth of 
liberal internationalism in the world community, which began with the League 
of Nations and continued in the United Nations after World War 2: 
If that [possession] meant we had to smile fixedly while the League of 
Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission noted that we seemed to be 
doing less in territory contiguous to us than distant Germany had done in 
years before r9r4, or while United Nations committees harried us, so be it; 
if that meant that Labor governments must defend South African racial pol-
icy lest breaches in domestic jurisdiction jeopardise their control over New 
Guinea, so be it; if it meant that until the early r96os, when a little belatedly 
we learned to make pious noises while going our own way, we fell into the 
then dubious company of states like Spain and Portugal, so be it.29 
Supporting others' empires in Australia's region was more divisive at home, 
but the Menzies government endorsed the maintenance of European 
influence where possible, and gradual withdrawal where it was not. Where 
remnants of Britain's 'Far East' empire were sufficiently strategic, Australian 
governments sought to take them over. In the Indian Ocean, to which test 
rockets were fired from the Australian desert, and across which aircraft 
and shipping needed to travel safely towards Europe, the Cocos Islands and 
Christmas Island changed hands from British to Australian administration. 
That the first to transfer, the Cocos (1955), did so with agonising slowness 
was due to the complications that came with trying to maintain a strict white 
Australia policy while assuming responsibility for a British dependency with 
a non-white population. Looking towards the Pacific, PNG held sway as 
the bulwark in strategic wisdom, so minor outposts of the British Empire, 
such as the Solomon Islands, were better left in British hands for as long as 
possible. 30 
In very brief survey, the years 1955, 1965 and 1975 help trace the climax 
of Australia's security-dominated approach to regional decolonisation, and 
29 WJ. Hudson, 'Strategy for Survival', in M. McKernan and M. Browne (eds), Australia: 
Two Centuries of War and Peace (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 38. 
30 See generally, David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain's 
Empire (Melbourne University Press, 2002). 
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its consequences. In 1955 Australia's commitment to a British-organised Far 
East Strategic Reserve of an Australian Army battalion and a squadron of 
bombers met two objectives: it curbed the anti-colonial movement and it 
signalled an Australian preparedness to move to any location in Southeast 
Asia that might be a Cold War flashpoint. It was important to demonstrate 
the commitment to 'forward defence' to Australia's allies, especially the 
United States. 
Ten years later, in 1965, Australian troops in Malaysian Borneo were help-
ing resist small-scale Indonesian incursions from neighbouring Kalimantan. 
This was the height of Indonesian president Sukarno's 'Confrontation' policy 
and his militant opposition to the recently formed Federation of Malaysia. 
It occurred in the wake of the Indonesian incorporation of West Papua in 
1961-62, a process that gained international approval but caused considerable 
Australian anxiety. Deteriorating relations with Indonesia, and the prospect 
of expanded conflict in New Guinea and elsewhere, had prompted the rein-
troduction of national service at the end of 1964, this time via a ballot system 
based selectively on birthdays. In September 1965 Indonesia was wracked by 
internal revolution and retribution that effectively ended Sukarno's power 
and overseas militancy. 
Earlier in that year, Menzies had announced the dispatch of an Australian 
battalion to South Vietnam, in response to a 'request' engineered from 
the South Vietnamese government, then struggling to combat the armed 
forces of the (communist) Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the north. 
Provoking great controversy at home, Australian national servicemen were 
required to serve overseas, and thus joined the commitment to Vietnam. 
In what was Australia's longest involvement in twentieth-century war, 
more than 50,000 Australians served in Vietnam (including 17,424 national 
servicemen), the commitment growing to a peak of three battalions and 
supporting units and small contributions by naval and air forces, until final 
withdrawal at the end of 1972. Based in the southern coastal province of 
Phuoc Tuy; the Australians fought mostly search-and-destroy missions, 
with the exception of occasional bigger actions such as the battle of Long 
Tan in August 1966. Menzies' successor as prime minister, Harold Holt, 
captured the centrality of the American alliance in Australian involvement 
in Vietnam when he picked up the electoral slogan of US president Lyndon 
Baines Johnson and suggested that Australia would go 'all the way with LBJ'. 
Australia lost 501 personnel, compared to the US figure of over 58,000, and 
their ally South Korea, with over 5,000 dead. The greatest casualties were, 
of course, among the Vietnamese, with the North suffering more than 
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1 million deaths in battle and the South a quarter of a million (and, in both 
cases, huge civilian casualties).31 
In 1975 the Labor government led by Gough Whitlam granted 
independence to PNG following the formation of political parties, the 
adoption of a constitution, and Australian insistence that secessionist 
movements, particularly that on the island of Bougainville, would have no 
means of declaring independence in the transfer of power. In the same year, 
the sudden end of Portugal's overseas empire brought a power struggle to 
the eastern half of the island of Timor (the western half was already part 
of Indonesia). In an unworkable compromise, the Whitlam government 
favoured the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia but in a manner 
that suggested self-determination for its people. When the East Timorese 
independence movement, Fretilin, declared independence, Indonesia 
completed incorporation by means of invasion, and Australia was among the 
first to grant recognition. 
While shocking many Australians, this policy reflected a new determination 
to foster a strong relationship with Indonesia, and a blend of pragmatism and 
symbolism designed to engage more directly with Australia's neighbourhood. 
By the early 1970s Japan had emerged as Australia's most important trading 
partner. Upon coming to power at the end of 1972, Whitlam followed up his 
earlier visit to Beijing by establishing official diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China. He also took the last steps towards complete 
dismantling of the white Australia policy. In particular, Whitlam ratified the 
United Nations Convention eliminating all forms of racial discrimination 
and enacted matching Australian legislation in 1975. Australia was also the 
first dialogue partner (1974) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) formed in 196732 
Australians' orientation towards Asia grew quickly: After the end of the war 
in Vietnam, Australia accepted 130,000 refugees, and by the early r98os over 
one-third of the migrant flow was from Asia.33 And in the wake of the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates and a balance of payments crisis 
in the r98os, Canberra increasingly sought economic security in Asia. Prime 
Minister Hawke successfully championed the formation of the Asia Pacific 
31 Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp. 248-9; Lee, Australia and the World in the 
Twentieth Century, pp. 172-3. 
32 David Goldsworthy et aL, 'Reorientation', in David Goldsworthy (ed.), Facing North: 
A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia. Volume 11 1901 to the 1970s (Melbourne 
University Press, 2001), pp. 310-71. 
33 Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century, p. 291. 
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Economic Cooperation (APEC) group in 1989. At the same time he drastically 
reduced tariffs, floated the Australian dollar, liberalised controls on foreign 
investment and encouraged privatisation of state-owned utilities. These sweep-
ing reforms accompanied closer economic ties to the dynamic economies of 
Northeast Asia, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. 
Finally, the way in which Australia's security interests were developed 
and articulated also changed slowly. For two-thirds of the century, the 
pattern of Anglo-Australian exchange and the recurrence of wars, hot and 
then cold, reinforced prime ministerial dominance of policy relating to 
Australia in world affairs. Overseas posts grew in number after World War 
2, especially in Asia. The growth of the Washington Embassy (necessary for 
the US-Australian relationship and representation at the United Nations), 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was a significant 
development of the 1950s and 1960s, challenging the pre-eminence of the 
Australian High Commission in London. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Australians recaptured some of their early advocacy for a strengthened 
United Nations, elevating the notion of international citizenship and leading 
a difficult but successful peace process to enable the Vietnamese withdrawal 
from Cambodia.34 
Anti-war and self-reliance 
Since the South African War at the start of the century, public protests have 
accompanied Australia's involvement in wars and, in more recent times, its 
military alliances. The more prominent voices of protest against participation 
in the South African War included the New South Wales politician 
WA. Holman, and the professor of history George Arnold Wood. Both 
railed against a capricious and greedy extension of empire in southern Africa, 
led by fortune seekers. They drew on a British liberal suspicion of unjust 
conquest and cartel that was always a recurring risk, even for enlightened 
imperial projects such as Britain's. Holman, on the left of the Labor Party, also 
included a fiery denunciation of capitalism's recurring need for militarism; 
and the racist as well as nationalist Bulletin magazine tapped the deep vein of 
34 On foreign policy making and overseas representation, see Joan Beaumont, Christopher 
Waters and David Lowe with Garry Woodard, Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: 
Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941-1969 (Melbourne University Press, 2003). On the 
new internationalism of the late 1980s and early 1990s, see Gareth Evans and Bruce 
Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Melbourne University Press, 
1992). 
512 
Security 
insecurity that saw Australia as a fragile experiment, needing to preserve its 
stock of white manhood and resist foreign workers.35 
Protests against the South African War were largely drowned out by high 
levels of official and public support. Thereafter, the composition of anti-war 
groups broadened in ways that incorporated opposition to compulsory 
military training, introduced in 19n, and featured familiar root values: 
unjust wars and religious pacifism; liberal and socialist critiques; and radical, 
sometimes racial, constructions of Australian interests. The broadening 
base of protest has also led historians to consider anti-war movements in 
conjunction with the more general mobilisation of women in public life, and 
as case studies of overseas influences entering Australia. The Women's Peace 
Army not only emerged during the World War I as a defiant source of protest 
at the war and conscription, but it also propelled its leaders such as Adela 
Pankhurst into the public sphere.36 Later in the century the anti-Vietnam 
War moratorium marches were fuelled by precedents in American cities; and 
other groups, such as the Save Our Sons movement protesting conscription 
during the Vietnam War, seemed to blend Quaker pacifism with Gandhian 
non-violent resistance.37 
Attempts to introduce conscription during World War I, and Billy Hughes' 
heavy-handed actions against opponents, encouraged a coalition of anti-war 
groups. The new Anti-Conscription League provided an umbrella for some 
peace groups in New South Wales, while the Australian Peace Alliance based 
in Melbourne assumed leadership of some of the more radical organisations. 
The Communist Party of Australia was prominent in the peace movement 
in the inter-war years, especially in the wake of failed hopes in the League 
of Nations; and although outlawed for two years during World War 2, it 
emerged afterwards at the head of the post-war peace movement. The other 
challenge to the prosecution of war came from extreme conservative nation-
alists early in World War 2; the leaders of the Australia First Movement were 
interned in March 1942. The ban on the Communist Party was not lifted until 
the end of that year, despite party support for the war effort in the wake of 
Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. 
35 Malcolm Saunders and Ralph Summy, 'One Hundred Years of an Australian Peace 
Movement 1885-1984: Part I, From the Sudan Campaign to the Outbreak of the Second 
World War', Peace and Change, IO, 3-4 (1984): 41-2. 
36 Joy Damousi, 'Marching to Different Drums: Women's Mobilisations 1914-1939', in 
Kay Saunders and Raymond Evans (eds), Gender Relations in Australia: Domination and 
Negotiation (Sydney: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), pp. 350-75. 
37 Alan D. Gilbert and Ann-Mari jordens, 'Traditions of Dissent', in McKernan and 
Browne (eds), Australia, p. 346. 
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The Investigation Branch of the Attorney General's Department was 
responsible for internal security until 1946, when the Commonwealth 
Investigation Service was formed. It was not unusual that two brigadiers 
headed the new service, as military figures had provided leadership through-
out the growth of Australia's surveillance bureaucracies and would also 
figure in ASIO. From 1949, when the Soviet Union boasted its own atomic 
bomb, the threat of nuclear war provided a rallying point for a new peace 
movement. With the USSR's international arm, the Cominform, provid-
ing direction and support for a World Peace Council, the Cold War context 
for peace movements was quickly established. Three Protestant ministers 
in Melbourne founded the Australian Peace Council in 1949, but it took the 
best part of the next decade for it to counter the Cold War taint and the 
government blasts directed at it, and build a broader base. The swelling of 
the peace movement with the participation of trade unions, the intelligentsia 
and additional church members did not soften the hostility of the Australian 
government. ASIO's remit was sufficiently broad to allow surveillance of 
those protesting from religious and liberal traditions as well as socialist ones; 
and some of the subsequent accounts of peace activism by historians draw 
heavily on the ASIO records.38 
Although unsuccessful in denting public support for peacetime compul-
sory military training (a major issue in the 1966 election won by the Liberal-
Country Party Coalition government), the peace movement later took to 
the streets to protest against Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War. 
Anti-war and anti-conscription forces joined in the late 1960s through the 
Moratorium movement, which brought around 120,000 onto the streets of 
Australian cities and towns on 8 May 1970. Subsequent moratoriums saw 
smaller numbers but maintained the relatively broad coalition of students, 
feminists, churches and trade unions. Although the Moratorium movement 
was significant in its size and diversity, the Australian government's decision 
to pull forces out of Vietnam was influenced more by the American decision 
to withdraw.39 
Somewhat ironically; one of the main outcomes of Australia's involvement 
in Vietnam was the need to think more in terms of defence self-reliance. In 
1969 President Richard Nixon announced a program of progressive withdrawal 
38 Fiona Capp, Writers Defi.led: Security Surveillance of Australian Authors and Intellectuals 
1920---1960 (Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1993); Phillip Deery, 'War on Peace: Menzies, 
the Cold War and the x953 Convention on Peace and War', Australian Historical Studies, 
34, 122 (2003): 248-69. 
39 Murphy, Harvest of Fear, pp. 215)---58. 
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of US troops from Vietnam and signalled an expectation that America's allies 
would henceforth be expected to share more of the burdens of regional 
security. Both the circumstances of US withdrawal and the declaration of 
greater efforts by allies caught the Australians by surprise. Not being able to 
rely on US military involvement in Southeast Asia was a shock to which the 
Australians were slow to adjust, but which ultimately provided for greater 
clarity- especially when British plans to withdraw their military presence from 
east of Suez were also confirmed. Two defence white papers, in 1976 and 1987, 
built a strong case for an Australian Defence Force that should be able to detect 
and defend against an enemy lodged in islands to Australia's north or in sea 
and air approaches; but the latter paper also stressed the importance of the US 
alliance. Under Kim Beazley, who was Minister for Defence from 1984 to 1990, 
Australia began to produce more of its defence needs, including submarines, 
but intelligence developments were dependent on US collaboration. In 1991 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke committed Australian naval forces in support of 
the United Nations-backed liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi invaders. Hawke 
justified the move in terms of upholding international law, but the US lead 
in taking the battle to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was clearly a factor in his 
thinking. In the wake of al-Qaeda's spectacular suicide attacks on the United 
States on n September 2001, when President George Bush declared the 'war 
on terror', the Australian prime minister John Howard invoked ANZUS, later 
committing 2,000 troops and naval units to the multinational force invading 
Iraq. A modest Australian military contingent joined US and allied forces in 
Afghanistan at the end of 2001 to fight the Taliban, believed to be harbouring 
key figures of al-Qaeda. In 2002 this 'war on terror' was brought home to 
Australia when 88 Australians were among 202 killed by terrorist bombings in 
the Indonesian island of Bali. 40 
These incidents also triggered a raft of Australian anti-terror laws in 
the following decade, encroaching on such rights as fair trial, freedom 
from arbitrary detention and searches, privacy, and freedom of expression 
and movement. At one level, Australian governments, along with other 
democracies and as in previous global conflicts, were reacting in a familiar 
fashion - and this time there was a need to create laws that would not only 
prosecute but also prevent acts of terrorism. But some of the more than 50 
new statutes were worryingly extreme for many observers, especially for 
their possible endurance beyond the immediate threat of terror. The capacity 
and willingness of the state to encroach on individual rights, in a country 
40 Grey, A Military History of Australia, ch. n. 
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without a Bill of Rights or other legislation incorporating internationally 
recognised human rights into domestic law, cast historical shadows back to 
the days of Hughes and the over-zealous security service.41 
The end of the Cold War provided little guidance in resolving the tension 
between alliance and self-reliance running through Australian defence 
planning. Possible threats were now splintered into small states and terrorist 
groups. New concerns emerged about global warming, joining longstanding 
questions of food and energy security and the spread of infectious diseases 
that might accompany the great increase of people movements across national 
boundaries. Nor did older problems of nuclear and chemical weapons disappear 
with the end of the Cold War. Australian governments of the 1980s and 1990s 
played prominent roles in some preventive efforts such as the conclusion of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for nuclear weapons (1996) and a Chemical 
Weapons Convention (1997) preventing the production, storage or use of 
chemicals that might be used for mass destruction. Australian protesters, 
mobilised from a broad base, marched against the renewed nuclear arms race 
of the 1980s, nuclear-armed visits by US ships, and French atmospheric nuclear 
testing in the Pacific. 
The history of Australian security reveals enduring preoccupations. The 
early-twentieth century globalism through which security concerns in the 
Pacific were viewed reflected the circumstances of Australia's Federation, 
which came at the high point of European imperial competition. It also 
reflected the pragmatic and intellectual consequences of Australian politicians' 
sense of their role in the South Pacific. Australia's vast coastline and small 
population led logically to hopes that a trained citizenry would take up arms 
when needed. In 1913, at the laying of the foundation stone of Parliament 
House in Canberra, Billy Hughes recalled that Australian settlers had killed 
Aboriginal people in order to take possession of their land, and he challenged 
his colleagues to build on the tenuous foothold they had established on the 
continent.42 For around two-thirds of the century, many others shared his 
anxiety that white Australians risked being supplanted by a stronger (most 
likely, Asian) race, thereby suffering the same fate as Australia's Indigenous 
people. 
The globalist outlook was sustained by this concern, even as Europe's 
influence overseas, and Britain's Empire in particular, shrank. Two world 
41 George Williams, 'A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws', Melbourne University Law 
Review, 35 (20n): n36-76; see also Andrew Lynch and George Williams, What Price 
Security? Taking Stock of Australia's Anti-Terror Laws (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006). 
42 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March 1913. 
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wars were followed by another long 'Cold War', also global in reach and 
reinforcing ideas about the connectedness of change in Australia's region 
and the importance of alliances in a global struggle. Such an outlook was 
complicated by; but coexisted with, developments such as the internationalism 
of the United Nations, the growth of overseas aid, the need for bilateral 
alliances in security and trade, the retreat by Britain into Europe, and the 
growth of regional architecture in Asia and the Pacific. Provincial globalism 
affected those on the ground, too. Australian troops serving in Malaya in the 
1950s periodically had to train for possible involvement in a global conflict 
that might include the use of nuclear weapons. After a long adjustment to 
a region drained of European predominance, Australians' security conver-
sations of the twenty-first century retain the tension between alliance and 
self-reliance, and in a modern twist on the global-regional, now feature the 
consequences of late-phase globalisation. 
